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One approach in contemporary international relations 
theory is the moralist position. Most moralists argue that 
obligations which an individual has toward the state and 
toward persons qua fellow citizens should not override the 
obligations which every individual has toward other persons 
qua members of humanity. Essential to a moralist approach 
is the idea that every individual shares some feature, such 
as rights, which is universal to all men and incontrovert-
ible by any body. Many moralists base their theory upon the 
thought of Hugo Grotius, equating Grotius ' s thought with 
their own moralist approach. 
2 
This thesis argues that Grotius does not present a 
universal ethic and that his thought does not serve as a 
foundation for contemporary moralist theory. Individualist 
elements of Grotius's thought which do uphold a universalist 
ethic should not be viewed in isolation; his natural law 
argument includes a notion of community as well as 
individual rights. Grotius accommodates individualism and 
community in what I call a Grotian "conciliation." 
To argue that Grotius's theory is one of conciliation, 
I analyze his discussions of society and contend that 
throughout his discussions Grotius identifies man as an 
individual with obligations to respect the rights of all 
others as well as a citizen with obligations to the superior 
rights of the sovereign. I then compare Grotius's thought 
to that of Immanuel Kant in order to demonstrate that the 
accommodation found in Grotius is not equivalent to Kant's 
universalist ethic. To equate his thought to Kant's 
thought, or to any other universalist ethic, is to attribute 
concerns to Grotius which are not necessarily addressed in 
his theory. Not only may this do an injustice to the 
different concerns by Grotius, but it overlooks the 
possibility that Grotius's conciliation may offer an 
alternative to, rather than a substantiation of, the 
moralist approach in international relations theory. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE GROTIAN CHALLENGE 
And I am called wise, for my hearers always 
imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I 
find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of 
Athens, that God only is wise; and by his answer he 
intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth 
little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, 
he is only using my name by way of illustration, as 
if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who like 
Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth 
nothing. And so I go about the world obedient to 
the god, and search and make enquiry into the wisdom 
of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who appears 
to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindica-
tion of the oracle I show him that he is not wise .. 
1 
We soon see that, although enlightenment is easy 
in thesi, yet in hypothesi it is difficult and slow 
of accomplishment . . . (as] there are never wanting 
others who promise with much confidence that they 
are able to satisfy our curiosity, it must be very 
hard to maintain in or restore to the mind 
(especially the mind of the public) that bare 
negative which properly constitutes enlightenment.2 
Hugo Grotius, the so-called "father of modern 
international law," and early figure in the natural rights 
tradition, is also the defender of a universalist ethic. 
Grotius's theory is characterized by some contemporary 
scholars as presenting the international realm as a 
universal society of individuals. This characterization 
presents his thought as subordinating the obligations and 
ties between individual members of a community to the 
obligations and ties between individuals in universal 
society. However, he organizes society as a hierarchy that 
justifies and emphasizes the community's imposition of 
obligations. Grotius's theory is more complex because it 
blends elements of a universal ethic with the notion of 
community in what I shall call a "Grotian conciliation." 
2 
To question this universalist interpretation of his 
thought is to discuss Grotius in terms of a contemporary 
debate in international relations between moralists and 
state-centrists. 3 Moralists have often used Grotius to 
support the argument that a universal moral code that 
applies to relations between individuals ought to be 
respected by states as well. 4 The state ought not to 
operate according to the internal obligations it has to its 
citizens alone--which would be the argument of many state 
centrists--but should subordinate internal obligations to 
those external obligations that bind each man to every other 
individual coexisting in universal society. An approach 
emphasizing the elements of universalism found in Grotius's 
thought supports this moralist argument. 
One interpretation exemplifying the emphasis of 
universalist elements found in Grotius is Hedley Bull's 
characterization of Grotian sociability as "solidarity."~ A 
central premise of sociability as solidarity is that states 
ought to enforce the natural law which prescribes the 
sociability and fellowship of mankind. 6 For Grotius, 
natural law provides the incontrovertible and unimpeachable 
3 
basis for all positive law such that, even in interstate 
relations, individual rights protected by natural law must 
be respected as sacrosanct. Solidarity means that any one 
state is responsible for all individuals and that any 
state's own particular concerns or existence are subordinate 
to this common concern for all men. In support of 
sociability as solidarity, Andrew Linklater says that 
according to Grotius external obligations of individuals may 
be assumed but not overridden by the state. 7 Grotius does 
support this interpretation by arguing that natural law 
applies to every individual and that, as long as man's 
nature itself remains unchanged, natural law is universal 
and immutable. 8 The state may aid man in fulfilling 
obligations deriving from natural law, but may not override 
these individual obligations for the sake of any perceived 
greater good. Grotian sociability as solidarity reinforces 
the notion that society for Grotius is primarily universal. 
Grotius's statements in De Jure Belli ac Pacis {and 
other of his works as well) often support the idea that all 
positive law must defer to natural law and rights--this 
shall not be contested. 9 But to interpret his sociability 
as solidarity is to overemphasize the universalist elements 
in Grotius's thought. 10 I shall contend that an analysis 
cannot stop here if it is to be supported by a Grotian 
foundation. Grotius himself means much more by sociability 
and universalist elements of his thought cannot be isolated 
4 
without distortion of meaning. Although Grotius does not 
address the debate between moralists and state centrists, 
his thought viewed in light of that debate may present an 
alternative to either approach. I shall argue that the 
accommodation of universalism and community is not 
equivalent to the moralist approach; and I shall do so by 
first examining the works of Grotius, and then comparing his 
approach to the universalism of Immanuel Kant. If Grotius's 
conciliation cannot be interpreted as a universal ethic, 
then a dependence upon his thought as a foundation for 
contemporary theory must be the result of a choice. Grotius 
challenges theorists to choose either to base a universalist 
ethic upon another foundation or to incorporate a notion of 
community in universalism and retain the Grotian 
conciliation. 
Preliminary Remark 
Before proceeding, several terms to be used in the 
following argument should be introduced. Grotius's 
statements that are relied upon by moralist scholars as 
evidence of a universalist ethic are often referred to in 
this thesis as "liberal." This is because such statements 
share features with liberal theory. Both liberal theory and 
an international universalist ethic exhibit an emphasis upon 
the individual and upon equality between individuals.11 
Liberals characterize the state as an entity responsible to 
the standard of justice rather than to the standard of the 
5 
good. 12 This suggests that individuals are equally capable 
of choosing the good and need only be free to do so; the 
implication is that the state or any authority ought not 
impose a value upon individuals which could create a means 
of distinguishing between men. Likewise, a universalist 
ethic characterizes the state as an entity that ought to be 
confined to reinforcement of the universal obligations 
existing between individuals. To suggest that universalist 
statements made by Grotius are liberal is to suggest that he 
at times emphasizes the individualism and equality also 
present in liberal thought. 
Another term that needs clarification is "community." 
Communitarians have been critical of the liberal tradition, 
claiming that morality and obligation do not arise from the 
interaction of individuals in accordance with a universal 
principle; rather morality and obligation require the 
context of a community in order to make sense. Part of the 
argument for conciliation contends that, in his national law 
theory, Grotius includes a justification of community. In 
doing so, Grotius does not prove to be a communitarian, but 
to offer a conciliation which accommodates community and 
individualism in a theory not adequately represented as a 
universalist ethic. 
The concepts of liberalism and community are not 
introduced in an attempt to fit Grotius into the larger 
debate between liberals and communitarians. Rather it is to 
suggest that a problem exists in the characterization of 
Grotius as a universalist--he accommodates a notion of 
community which is not usually seen as consistent with a 
liberal framework such as that of contemporary 
universalists. 
6 
NOTES 
1 Plato, "Apology," in Dialogues of Plato, ed. J. D. 
Kaplan, trans. Jowett (New York: Washington Square Press, 
1951) 13. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. 
Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 1951) 137. 
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3 Some of the scholars ref erred to here as presenting 
Grotius as a moralist are: Andrew Linklater, Men and 
Citizens in the Theory of International Relations (New York: 
st. Martin's Press, 1982); Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality: 
Justice and the State in World Politics," International 
Organization, XXXIII (Summer 1979) 405-429; Hersch 
Lauterpacht, "The Grotian Tradition in International Law," 
in International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, ed. 
Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 10-35; and Hedley Bull, "The 
Grotian Conception of International Society," in Diplomatic 
Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 
Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) 51-73. One of 
many examples of the state centrist position is Michael 
Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four 
Critics," Philosophy & Public Affairs, IX (Spring 1980) 209-
229. 
4 This is a generalization of the arguments presented 
by some of the moralists cited in footnote 3 above. 
8 
~ Bull, 51-73, Bull's stance on Grotius is different 
from others, as his is a critique of the solidarist 
position; Beitz and Linklater, who both concur with the 
solidarist position, cite Bull's interpretation as 
authoritative. Sociability itself is the natural attraction 
of each human being toward others of his species and will be 
discussed at great length below. 
s Bull, 51-73. 
1 Linklater, 76. 
8 At one point Grotius says, "What we have been saying 
would have a degree of validity even if we should concede 
that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, 
that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no 
concern to him." Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace, 
trans. Frank W. Kelsey (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1957) 10. 
9 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, trans. A. 
C. Campbell (New York: M. Walter Dunn, 1901). 
10 This would apply for other universalist 
interpretations of Grotius beside that of solidarity. 
11 Admittedly liberal theory covers a great range and 
this characterization is not to suggest otherwise. For just 
one example see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971). 
12 For a characterization of liberal theory made by 
critics expressing communitarian concerns, see Steven B. 
Smith, "Hegel's Critique of Liberalism," American Political 
Science Review LXXX (March 1986) 121-139; also see Michael 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCILIATION I: THE CONTEXT OF SKEPTICISM 
In order to discuss Grotius's accommodation of 
community and individualism, one must discuss Grotian 
sociability as other than solidarity. This task is 
complicated by the realization that Grotius does not prof fer 
one theoretical framework, but changes his thought over 
time. 1 One might consider the Grotian conciliation in light 
of the alterations in Grotius's thought between De Jure 
Praedae and the Belli. If the changes he makes cannot be 
explained by any change in his accommodation, then something 
else must explain the changes. If Grotius offers a 
conciliation similar in both the Praedae and the Belli, then 
this is a good indication that he considered community and 
individualism to be compatible. This is a first step toward 
separating Grotius's from a universalist position. I intend 
to argue that the alterations that Grotius effects can be 
explained in terms of his change from a dependence of reason 
upon will to a dependence of will upon reason. In other 
words, the changes in his thought can be understood in terms 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth century debates over 
skepticism rather than in terms of the conciliation itself .2 
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THE DEBATE 
The relevant context of skepticism is a debate 
concerning the extent of man's knowledge and freedom. There 
have always existed debates over the extent of man's 
knowledge. The sixteenth century debate between Luther and 
Erasmus concerned freedom as well as knowledge. 3 Inherent 
in Luther's arguments is the premise that man does not gain 
salvation by any physical act or act of reason because God's 
will is completely unfettered--therefore, God's will and so 
his grace is not predicated upon the behavior of any 
individual man. 4 Through the criterion of conviction, the 
individual can know that he has been saved; he can know 
God's will. 0 This does not establish any law of nature 
accessible to man's reason. For Luther, God (the universal) 
is accessible but is not bound by reason. 6 The question of 
will versus reason for Luther (and others) is a question 
concerning freedom: God is free from laws of reason binding 
his will; and man is free from ecclesiastical authority, 
since that authority can have no power over the will of God, 
and thus no definitive criterion of God's will other than 
that accessible to the individual himself . 7 Man's freedom 
for Luther then is restricted to the ascertainment of a 
criterion for God's will; here the individual is given a 
central place. 
Luther argues that the will predominates over reason. 
In so arguing, he follows the sentiment of Duns Scotus 
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rather than St. Thomas. 8 If God's reason predominates, as 
Aquinas would say, then objects have a specific nature which 
man can discover through his own reason. In this way, men 
participate in God's reason; the world is lawful; and to a 
certain extent man can know the world as God created it. If 
God's will predominates as Scotus and Luther would argue, 
then things do not have a nature knowable to man, for God 
could have created the world entirely different. 9 God's 
will, according to the Scotists, is not bound by the 
dictates of reason. 10 In his own transition between the 
Praedae and the Belli, Grotius moves from a Scotist to a 
Thomist position. 
It is reasonably clear that Grotius's position in the 
Belli, when seen in the context of this debate, is that of a 
Thomist. This is the position taken by both Charles Edwards 
and A. H. Chroust and is supported by many statements made 
by Grotius. At one point, Grotius says: 
What we have been saying [about the status of 
natural law and rights] would have a degree of 
validity even if we should concede that which cannot 
be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that 
there is not a God or that the affairs of man are of 
no concern to him. The very opposite of this view 
has been implanted in us partly by reason .. 11 
Here, as Chroust and Edwards argue, Grotius is not 
supplanting the medieval concept of God with the idea that 
God is merely a first principle from which we can deduce the 
laws of the remainder of the universe. 1 2 In other words, 
the typical interpretation that this statement is modern and 
13 
secular does not fully appreciate the extent to which 
Grotius retains God as necessary for the hierarchical 
structure of the universe. 13 Grotius is asserting in this 
statement, as Chroust and Edwards both strongly affirm, that 
natural law is not dependent upon God's will, but upon his 
reason. Therefore, underlying the contingency of the world 
is a lawful immutable nature which man, created in God's 
image of a reasoning being, can know. 
Grotius's position in the Belli may be Thomist but 
that identification does not explain the alterations he 
makes in the Belli from his theory as espoused in the 
Praedae. The skeptical debate provides a valuable context 
within which to view Grotius's works, as Chroust and Edwards 
suggest, but it is important not to view either the Belli or 
the Praedae in isolation.1• 
PREDOMINANCE OF THE WILL 
In the Praedae, Grotius has not yet developed his 
position. In the Belli Grotius articulates a position on 
law which affirms a standard independent of God (although 
God is the Author); such a standard is absent in the 
Praedae. Grotius opens the Praedae Prolegomena: "What God 
has shown to be His will, that is law. This axiom points 
directly to the cause of law, and is rightly laid down as a 
primary principle."1 5 He cites Aquinas as the source for 
this statement. However, Aquinas states that God's will 
------, 
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comprises divine law and divine law for Aquinas can be known 
to man by revelation alone, at the behest of the will of 
God.16 Instead of following Aquinas in this, Grotius 
identifies all natural law as the will of God, thereby 
conflating the Thomist categories of natural and divine law. 
Hence Grotius in this statement does not follow Aquinas, but 
indicates that reason is dependent upon the operation of the 
will. His sentiment is then closer to Scotus than Aquinas. 
How does Grotius move closer to a Scotist predominance 
of the will by conflating Aquinas's categories? Divine law 
equivalent to the will of God is, according to Aquinas, 
beyond the parameters of man's reason. Man can only know 
this law if God so desires. To say that all law emanates 
from God's will then is to place all law beyond reason; it 
is to suggest that no X is X due to a law of its nature, but 
is X due to God's command. Other statements made in the 
Praedae support the contention that Grotius's early position 
is more closely related to that of the Scotists. He says 
that God's will is law: " ... [W]hence Anarchus has 
correctly inferred . . . that a given thing is just because 
God wills it, rather than God wills the thing because it is 
just."17 This indicates that any Xis not absolutely just 
or good because of its nature, but because of God's command. 
God's command could have been different, which would make 
the nature of X different accordingly. Man's goal becomes 
to know God's will--Grotius's position then is reminiscent 
15 
of that of Luther. 18 Grotius continues, ". [T]he 
goddesses Right and Justice are not so much the assessors of 
Jove, as Jove himself is Right and Justice, and the most 
ancient and perfect of all laws." 19 God does not create a 
law which man can know by reason--God is law. This accords 
with the idea that God's will is the natural law. 
His position that all law is comparable to what 
Aquinas calls divine law does not force Grotius to also 
suggest that all law is hence beyond man's knowledge. Man's 
mission changes from discovering immutable law through his 
own reason to finding the criterion of God's will. 
Grotius's stance becomes much like Luther's. And as with 
Luther, the criterion of God's will is internal to the 
individual and so should similarly free the individual from 
any body claiming to disseminate an authoritative 
interpretation of God's will. 
THE CRITERION OF CONSENT 
According to Aquinas, since the divine law may not be 
known through reason, man can only know God's will through 
revelation. 20 God reveals his will as he wants man to know 
it. Grotius's identification of all law as God's will 
could place all law beyond the knowledge of man, were 
Grotius not to articulate an alternative means of knowing 
God's law. Grotius delineates a criterion of God's will 
accessible to the individual. He says first that, "The will 
of God is revealed, not only through oracles and super-
natural portents, but above all in the very design of the 
16 
Creator. "2 1 He adds, "And the Creator revealed to us 
once and for all, at our birth, whatever we are permitted to 
know. 11 22 This implants within man a one-time revelation of 
God. Man's knowledge is freed from dependence upon the 
continuing revelation of God, since this is implanted within 
the individual: and yet this revelation is a standard 
dependent upon God's will. Grotius appears to bridge the 
Scotist and Thomist positions in originating a criterion for 
knowing God's will. 
The criterion that Luther identifies for knowing God's 
will is the individual's conviction of his own salvation: 
for Grotius the criterion seems to be the will of the 
individual. Grotius says that man's will is law. 23 Since 
the natural law is not known through reason--since the law 
is not extant in the nature of things but in God's will--it 
must be known by man's will. The one-time revelation of God 
is expressed in man's will and for this reason, man's will 
is law itself. This is not to suggest that Grotius is 
saying that the individual will is always equivalent to 
God's will, but that it is probable evidence. Grotius says 
that one individual may not impose his will upon another.24 
This accords with Luther's sentiment that the criterion of 
God's will, being an internal criterion, should not be 
imposed upon individuals since there exists no authoritative 
17 
representative of God's will; any individual selected by God 
is capable of knowing God's will. Grotius seems to agree 
that no authority exists to expound God's will and impose it 
externally; the internal standard of man's individual will 
exists as a law to himself. The problem which arises with 
Grotius's criterion, however, is that ultimately he does 
support an external authority representing God's will--that 
authority is the consent of man. 
On consent, Grotius says that the rays of divine light 
(or reason) are clouded for the individual but are visible 
in the agreement of nations. 2 ~ In the individual, vice wars 
with good and in the presence of such discord, the 
individual cannot clearly see the good. This is reminiscent 
of the Greek idea of the One as the highest good--God is 
concord, which is also law, truth and good. 26 Concord 
between men is closer to the true and good since concord is 
more likely indicative of the One. Grotius says, 
"[U]niversal concord can exist only in relation to what is 
good and true." 27 So consent reflects God's will even more 
strongly than does individual will. This conflicts with the 
notion that there is no authoritative exposition of God's 
will, because although one's own will is the criterion, if 
that conflicts with the will of many, then to argue with 
that general consensus would be to encourage discord; in 
such a case, a steadfast stance of the individual, if held 
in opposition to the many, would not be an adherence to 
18 
truth but a misconception of the One. God's will which is 
the only standard of the good and true, is more certain when 
understood through consent than through one's individual 
wi11.2e Thus does Grotius's solution ultimately appear to 
be fairly problematic as a solution to the skeptical problem 
of knowledge--the internal criterion appears to wane as 
expressive of God's will in the face of the general consent 
of man. 
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITY 
The notion of consent does not appear to be the best 
device for securing man's knowledge against skeptical 
attacks. In the Belli, Grotius emphasizes the predominance 
of reason over the will in an argument more closely 
resembling that of Aquinas; the Belli presents a stronger 
argument for securing knowledge perhaps than the argument in 
the Praedae (the latter of which is ultimately dependent 
upon consent as a criterion for knowing God's will). The 
alteration Grotius makes can be understood in terms of the 
debates about skepticism. If Grotius recognized a need to 
abandon consent when he wrote the Belli, he did not 
recognize the need to abandon either universalism or 
community. 29 The conciliation present in the Praedae 
appears in the Belli in much the same form. 
In both the Praedae and the Belli, Grotius posits a 
universal society hierarchical under God; all men exist 
19 
universally, yet the community holds a revered place within 
the entirety. Throughout the world, men are brothers under 
God and even the obligations made do not erase their 
fellowship with one another. Although men enter into 
states, they are still bound to be fellows with one 
another.3° Grotius says: 
But wise and devout men have shown that God was 
founder and ruler of the universe and as Father of 
mankind that He had not separated human beings as He did 
the rest of living things into different species but 
willed them to be one race; that He had given them the 
same origin, the same structural organism, the ability 
to look each other in the face, language and other means 
of communication in order that they might recognize 
their natural social bond and kinship. 31 
This desire for fellowship is the sociability of men. 
Yet sociability as a natural law is the result of the 
will of God, as is all natural law in the Praedae. As such, 
once again, it is not part of man's nature, but is God's 
command. It is up to the individual to know and to follow 
that command. God commands that men be sociable and it is 
thus up to men to do everything possible to fulfill that 
command. If states make it easier to follow God's command 
of sociability--and Grotius suggests that states in fact do-
-then it is God's command to enter into states. 3 2 This 
command accords with Grotius's portrayal of the universe as 
a hierarchy under God. Men are accountable to kings and 
kings are directly accountable to God, the ultimate 
sovereign. 33 Thus does God's command justify the state. 
20 
And so in early Grotius there exists the conciliation which 
also exists in the Belli. 
Grotius's conciliation, since present in both the 
Praedae and the Belli, does not explain the change in his 
thought over time. These changes are comprehensible in the 
context of skepticism. Since conciliation is important to 
his thought throughout, it would seem that to extract the 
universalist elements and portray his as a universalist 
ethic would do damage to the complexity of his thought. 
This should become more clear in the next chapter, in 
discussing Grotius's conciliation in the Belli. 
NOTES 
1 Fujio Ito and Richard Tuck each mention this 
alteration but neither in great depth. See Ito, "The 
Thought of Hugo Grotius in the Mare Liberum," The Japanese 
Journal of International Law XVIII (1974) 1-14; and Tuck, 
Natural Rights Theories; Their Origin and Development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
21 
2 Grotius's thought is discussed in terms of skeptical 
battles by several authors. See A. H. Chroust, "Hugo 
Grotius and the Scholastic Natural Law Tradition," The New 
Scholasticism, XVIII (April 1943) 101-133; Charles s. 
Edwards, Hugo Grotius, The Miracle of Holland: a Study of 
Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981); 
Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Erasmus 
to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). 
3 Actually the question of freedom accompanies the 
skeptical debates even for Scotus. See Chroust, 103-104. 
4 Popkin, 1-8. See also Sheldon Wolin, Politics and 
Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960) 143-152. 
~ Popkin, 3. Popkin says, "In this declaration of 
Christian liberty, Luther set forth his new criterion of 
religiose knowledge, that what conscience is compelled to 
believe on reading Scripture is true . . . To raise even the 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCILIATION II: RETURN TO REASON 
In the Belli, Grotius incorporates universal society 
and community in a hierarchical structure as he did in the 
Praedae, but in place of the predominance of the will and 
consent he asserts the predominance of reason and natural 
rights. Basically the conciliation stays the same, while 
the theoretical structure itself changes. 
Since both universalist and communitarian concerns are 
accommodated in a Grotian conciliation, one cannot deny that 
Grotius shares certain of the universalist concerns espoused 
by many who consider him to be a cosmopolitan. 1 At one 
point--and he makes many similar statements--he says: 
If any person should prevent any other person from 
taking fire from his fire or a light from his torch 
I should accuse him of violating the law of human 
society, because that is the essence of its very 
nature.2 
However, the universalism of human fellowship is not his 
only concern. The problem of man which Grotius faces is 
more complex and it is in recognizing this that one begins 
to realize that one omits aspects of Grotius's thought when 
interpreting his theory to be entirely universalist. 
Grotius does not entirely rewrite the Greek ideas upon which 
he depends so heavily; rather he retains community and 
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attempts to unite it with individualism. 3 The problem which 
Grotius faces is lost in a universalist interpretation: The 
problem is to propound the standards which render man the 
subject of morality and justice while simultaneously to 
uphold the worth and superordination of man's associative 
relations which grant him a place and identity. 
MAN AS A SOCIAL BEING 
According to Grotius, man is a social being. He says: 
But among the traits characteristic of man is an 
impelling desire for society, that is, for the 
social life--not of any and every sort, but 
peaceful, and organized according to the measure of 
his intelligence, with those who are of his own kind 
... Stated as a universal truth, therefore, the 
assertion that every animal is impelled by nature to 
seek only its own good cannot be concluded. 4 
If Grotius begins with man as social, it seems requisite to 
ask where individuality enters. In fact, Grotius's 
statement is reminiscent of Aristotle's suggestion that man 
outside society must be a god or a beast.° For Aristotle, 
fulfilling one's humanity consists in contributing to a 
polis; virtue lies in one's contribution to society.6 Man's 
very happiness or self-sufficiency is societal for 
Aristotle--the good life with the appropriate externalities, 
such as friends, which make one complete and whole. 
Grotius does not share Aristotle's idea that 
individual fulfillment is to be found in the polis. What is 
natural for Aristotle is identified with man's end--it is 
man's purpose to fulfill himself in society. The 
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conventional for Aristotle is identified with nature, as 
man's end is both natural and conventional; what it means to 
be a man is to live in society. 7 Grotius's idea is 
different; for Grotius, society is that universal society of 
all men. 8 Thus the conventional does not necessarily 
fulfill the end of man unless it is in accordance with law 
governing that universal society. 9 This places the Grotian 
resolution in a different perspective than the Aristotelian-
-dependent upon a hierarchy rather than the polis. 
Ultimately Grotius does address community in a manner 
reminiscent of Aristotle, but, insofar as Grotius's society 
is universal, the classical theory of the polis is not 
replicated. Included in the notion of universal society is 
the idea that each individual may justifiably assert claims 
which comprise obligations incumbent upon all others; this 
portrayal is quite different than one positing obligations 
as incurred between sovereign and citizens. The polis writ 
large does not translate well as the object of a 
communitarian theory. Thus the idea that Grotius's theory 
is universalist appears to be viable, and sociability seems 
to be a conception of universal fellowship, with each 
individual sharing obligations with every other individual 
in universal society. 
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STOIC ORIGINS 
In identifying man's sociability with a universal 
society, Grotius is following Zeno, Chrysippus, and Seneca 
rather than Aristotle, i.e., Grotian sociability derives 
from the Stoics.to The Stoics do have a universalist ethic. 
They say that the universe is a whole, informed by the 
material principle of Reason. 11 Man fulfills his end by 
cultivating his Reason, and thus by knowing the oneness of 
the universe. Since all men are capable of knowing this, 
there is an equality in Stoicism which is not present in 
other Greek thought. Man has certain responsibilities to 
others, who coexist in the universal community; he is not 
separated from his fellows by features which identify A 
differently than B. Man's nature is to participate in the 
One rather than in the conventional and the One seems not to 
afford such distinction. Grotius says that man has been 
"endowed with the faculty of knowing and acting in 
accordance with general principles. Whatever accords with 
that faculty is not common to all animals but peculiar to 
the nature of man." 12 In saying this, he reflects a 
sentiment which the Stoics seem to present as well. 
Controversy exists surrounding aspects of Stoic 
thought. 13 The concept of sociability is a concept more 
complex than can be appreciated if it is simply incorporated 
within contemporary theory as part of man's inclination 
toward every other individual in that universal society.14 
When we turn to the roots of sociability, we find that the 
concept may be more amenable to community than Grotius 
appears to conceive it to be. 
In introducing his concept of sociability, Grotius 
quotes Marcus Aurelius: 
Man was born to benefit others ... It would be 
easier to find a thing of earth out of relation with 
the earth than a human being wholly cut off from 
human kind . . . That which has the use of reason 
necessarily also craves civic life. 1 ~ 
And Seneca: 
Take it (society] away and you will destroy the 
sense of oneness in the human race, by which life is 
sustained. It is, in fact, taken away, if you shall 
cause that an ungrateful heart is not to be avoided 
on its own account.1 6 
Both statements appear to support universal society. John 
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M. Rist says that according to Marcus Aurelius, there exists 
a natural law of community.11 Sociability in this sense, 
says Rist, is connected to the early states of oikeiosis, a 
feeling of endearment, especially concern for one's 
family.is S. G. Pembroke elucidates Rist's comment by 
explaining that oikeiosis is a disposition toward another 
being.1 9 It is the beginning point of justice.20 But it 
cannot be that any disposition results in justice. Pembroke 
says, 
If Chrysippus or any Stoic did make a connection 
between justice and oikeiosis, it is unlikely that 
they excluded that stage of being well-disposed to 
moral values which is the final stage in the 
development of oikeiosis to oneself .21 
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Oikeiosis to others cannot be an "escape route" 
enabling a man to behave justly irrespective of his moral 
condition.22 In other words, sociability for the Stoics 
does not include moral obligation unless the actor is a 
virtuous being. For the Stoics, sociability is the 
beginning of one's virtue--a movement toward other men, 
toward the familiar, the desire to be with others. This 
could be called a fellowship, as Grotius quotes Seneca. 
However, for the Stoics this is not itself the basis of an 
ethic, rather the fitting of the self into the whole 
encompasses man's virtue. Therefore it would seem that only 
if the individual is a virtuous being (or a wise sage) is he 
then able to combine the concept of the ethical with that of 
his relations with others in the whole. 23 
To return to the citations used by Grotius, now 
another possibility arises for interpretation. Avoiding an 
ungrateful heart to Seneca might equate to avoiding 
oikeiosis or sociability with the nonsage who can never 
truly fit into the cosmopolity. This would accord with 
justice since it would grant the nonsage his due. The Stoic 
ethic is an elitist ethic; the cosmopolity is not quite as 
universal as it might appear; and sociability is merely an 
inclination which may be the starting point of justice and 
virtue only if the actor is a just man himself whose 
relations are informed by such an ethic.24 
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Grotian sociability, on the other hand, does not 
depend upon the individual's identity as a sage for the 
accommodation of justice and morality. For Grotius, it is 
up to each individual to maintain society. 2 ~ Grotius is 
reluctant to require a man to be characterized as a good 
sage in order to be capable of some responsibility for 
justice and society. Grotius identifies the bridge between 
the universal natural law and the association of man to be 
the right and responsibility of every man. He refuses to 
make the same commitment to community which the Stoics make. 
For Grotius a man need not be good in order to be just in 
his inclination toward sociableness. 
As Rist says, Stoic oikeiosis is the concept of 
avoiding the alien and of moving toward the familiar. 26 In 
his rendition of sociability, Grotius reinterprets this 
concept so that the basis of justice is to leave to another 
what belongs to him. 27 Similarities can be seen between the 
two: What is familiar to another is alien to me; I am drawn 
to my own as opposed to another's. Inherent in the concept 
is the idea of attraction as well as repulsion, which forms 
the basis for sociability as well as justice. But this is 
inherent to justice only under Grotius's pen because, as 
suggested, for the Stoics man must be just himself before 
oikeiosis indicates ''moral" relationships. To discern 
between the alien and familiar for Grotius is given a moral 
meaning because to him this defines a behavior conducive to 
peace; all must participate in sociability for peace to 
reign. 28 
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Thus Grotius does alter the Stoic notion of 
sociability; he seems to have freed man from distinctions of 
goodness or other attributes that the Stoics (and others) 
use to differentiate between individuals. 29 Grotius, in 
freeing men from such attributes of distinction, is able to 
more readily support a universal society. Individuals, 
according to Grotius, are recognized as equal, and thus 
society as a fellowship among equals rather than a society 
of wise sages is a universalist ethic. To stop here in the 
quest for the meaning of Grotian sociability, however, would 
be to do a great disservice to the problem which Grotius 
faces. Grotius does not support the equality of men, 
undifferentiated by any features relevant to a community, as 
it might seem from the discussion thus far. So, as it was 
important to see the differences between his concept and its 
Stoic derivation in order to gain an appreciation of 
universalism in Grotius, it is as important to look at other 
concerns which render Grotius's a theory of community as 
well. 
ARISTOTELIAN INFLUENCE AND GROTIAN RIGHTS 
Grotian rights cannot merely be interpreted as the de 
jure ability to do or own X, as one might use the term 
today. Rights for Grotius are not exactly that essence of 
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humanity which identifies each as an equal. 30 The Grotian 
notion of rights, when viewed in concert with sociability, 
addresses the complexity of man and his responsibilities to 
other men and society. 
In the Belli, Grotius offers three definitions of 
right: The maintenance of the social order; a moral 
quality; and law as far as what is proper. 31 The 
presumption underlying all three is that a right is not 
dependent upon the duty or obligation of another or upon the 
silence of the law. 32 In other words, to have a right, one 
need not wait upon the admission of another that such right 
exists; and a right is not merely that which the law does 
not proscribe. The natural law ought to prevent one from 
exceeding one's right--but this is merely a passive role for 
right. 33 A passive role entails the moral quality of a 
right attaching to one who has an accompanying obligation. 
An actor who stays within the confines of law, and so 
discharges his obligation, acts rightfully. 3 4 In Grotius's 
active rights theory, the moral quality attaches to the 
rightholder. 30 As Tuck says, the natural law for Grotius is 
''respect rights" which does not translate to a rule to 
adhere to one's obligation, but rather it requires that one 
act in a manner which maintains society. 36 By acting in 
accordance with rights, one exercises responsibility for 
society. Since that amount of responsibility differs 
between individuals, to respect rights also involves 
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respecting another's place in terms of responsibility for 
the society. Discharging this responsibility makes one a 
moral being. 
In behaving rightfully, one upholds law and justice 
and maintains the social order. In so doing, one acts in 
accordance with the inborn tendency toward society. This 
tendency translates into different responsibilities 
individuals have toward society. 
While Grotius says that each man has a responsibility 
for peace and so for society--and so each has rights--
ultimately he does distinguish between individuals in a 
manner similar to the Stoics and, to a greater extent, 
Aristotle. Grotian society not only is universal but it is 
organized hierarchically and the feature distinguishing 
between individuals is right. He ultimately recognizes that 
certain individuals hold a special place in a community 
because of their responsibility for society. Certain 
individuals who have greater responsibility for maintaining 
society rightfully hold a higher position in the hierarchy 
of universal society. The distinction between individuals 
may not depend upon the attribute of goodness, as it did for 
the Stoics, but Grotius still adheres to a distinction based 
upon the rights each may have in accordance with a role, 
such as sovereign. Grotius says, 
[A]s all members of the human body agree among 
themselves, because the preservation of each 
conduces to the welfare of the whole, so men should 
forbear from mutual injuries, as they were born for 
society, which cannot subsist unless all the parts 
of it are defended by mutual forbearance and good 
will. But as there is one kind of social tie 
founded upon an equality, for instance among 
brothers, citizens, friends, allies, and another on 
pre-eminence as Aristotle styles it, subsisting 
between parents and children, masters and servants, 
sovereigns and subjects, God and men, so justice 
takes place either amongst equals, or between the 
governing and governed parties, notwithstanding 
their differences of rank. The former of these, if 
I am not mistaken, may be called the right of 
equality, and the latter the right of superiority. 37 
Thus although men have rights equally, they do not have 
equal rights. 
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In a sense, one could argue that in discussing rights 
as unequal, Grotius is only ensuring that the sovereign is 
accountable to natural law. Without the existence of 
natural law and its applicability to all men, positive law 
might have no restraints. At least Grotius has subjected 
the sovereign to a law that constrains his ability to act; 
all men have rights which may not be infringed, even by the 
sovereign. Insisting that rulers, fathers and masters in 
positions of power also are responsible to the standards of 
right does limit such persons in their actions and 
relations. But Grotius insists that superior rights are 
superordinate to inferior rights, which suggests that in any 
conflict the superior are overriding. 38 This, of course, 
does not free rulers from the standards of natural right. 
But it does accord certain individuals a special place and 
role in the universal whole because of their identification 
in the community. In Grotius's hierarchy the association 
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not only maintains the totality of universal society, but it 
also exists as a body whose interpretation of natural law is 
more authoritative since its responsibility is greater. 3 9 
Mentioning Aristotle in his discussion of unequal 
rights introduces the source from which Grotius gains this 
portrayal of man's sociability. It is in Aristotle's 
discussion of friendship that he discusses unequal 
relationships in a manner comparable to Grotius. 40 The 
difference between Grotius and the Stoics--the allowance of 
man's place and identity--is less a difference than it 
initially appeared to be. 
On friendship, Aristotle says: 
A king's friendship to his subjects involves 
superior beneficence. For he benefits his subjects, 
since he is good and attends to them to ensure that 
they do well, as a shepherd attends to his sheep .. 
. by nature father is ruler over sons, ancestors 
over descendants, and king over subjects. All these 
are friendships of superiority; that is why parents 
are also honored. And what is just in these 
friendships is not the same in each case, but 
corresponds to worth; for so does the friendship. 4 1 
Although it may seem that the concepts of rights and 
friendship are quite different, Aristotle's discussion of 
friendship and Grotius's discussion of rights are not quite 
so distinct. In the first place, both are notions of man's 
relationships with one another; and, in the second place, 
both are connected to justice. For Aristotle, man's just 
relations are simplified when friendship is involved. 
Friendship is a relation of justice in the sense that a just 
man will treat another according to the other's virtue, 
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thence treating the other according to his deserts. 42 For 
Grotius, man's relations of right similarly entail a 
relationship in which one is accorded the respect 
concomitant with the right which he holds and so one's moral 
position in society is a relevant feature for justice. Both 
Aristotle and Grotius accord man a place in the community 
which affects his worth as a human being; the community, as 
well as one's place in it, is vital to the theory of each in 
a manner which might not be immediately recognized in 
Grotius. 
The reason that one might not immediately recognize 
this in Grotius is that, for Aristotle, man's virtue is 
recognized to be concerned with certain externalities--
Aristotle says for example that wealth and even friends help 
make it possible to be a virtuous man and so to contribute 
to the whole or the polis. 4 3 This accords with Aristotle's 
notion of justice, which as a mean takes account of 
particularities of each individual in order to speak of 
proper treatment or action. Thus it is clear that in 
Aristotle one's place and identity, being the recognition of 
what one contributes to the whole, are vital to his notion 
of justice and friendship; Aristotle's is clearly a theory 
of the communal relations of man. 
Grotius, on the other hand, seems to reject such a 
notion. In the Prolegomena he says, rejecting the notion of 
justice as proportional: 
To this exercise of judgment [as to what is law] 
belongs moreover the rational allotment to each man, 
or to each social group, of those things which are 
properly theirs, in such a way as to give the 
preference not to him who is more wise over the less 
wise, now to a kinsman rather than to a stranger, 
now to a poor man rather than to a man of means, as 
the conduct of each or the nature of the thing 
suggests. Long ago the view came to be held by many 
that this discriminating allotment is a part of law, 
properly and strictly so called; nevertheless law 
properly defined has a far different nature, because 
its essence lies in leaving to another that which 
belongs to him or in fulfilling our obligations to 
him.44 
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Grotius is not rejecting proportional justice as he seems to 
be in this statement, however. Because Grotius has 
redefined what is necessary for man's contribution to the 
society, redefined these as rights, then the other 
externalities needed by Aristotle for a contribution are 
superfluous. And what differentiates man's contribution to 
the whole then is retranslated--while there still exists a 
differentiation. Thus what may initially appear to be a 
turning away from a communitarian theory such as Aristotle 
offers, ultimately is a retranslation, embracing both 
individualism and communitarianism in a very complex manner. 
As early as the Praedae, Grotius accommodates 
individualism and community and he maintains both through 
all of the changes made in the Belli. The retention of 
conciliation amidst other change indicates an acknowledgment 
on his part of a problem with his response to a skeptical 
challenge rather than of a problem with his creation of a 
conciliation. Community may have posed a problem to liberal 
universalists since Grotius, but Grotius appears to have 
found it compatible within his own theory. 
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Since the moralist interpretations of Grotius of ten 
overlook his conciliation, one might expect that a 
universalist ethic would not admit the same conciliation 
found in Grotius. A comparison between the thought of 
Grotius and the universal ethic of Kant supports this 
expectation. The comparison also helps to suggest that 
costs may be incurred in extracting universalist elements 
from the theory of Grotius; and that presenting his theory 
in the moralist tradition often involves such an extraction. 
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CHAPTER IV 
KANT'S THEORY AS A UNIVERSALIST ETHIC 
Grotius not only justifies the state's existence but, 
because of the greater moral responsibility he identifies in 
the rights of the sovereign, he supports the state's role as 
a mediator between the individual and the natural law as 
well. A comparison of Grotius's theory to that of Immanuel 
Kant should indicate that a universalist ethic does not 
offer such support. To select the universalist elements of 
Grotius's thought as a foundation for contemporary theory 
then is not to rely upon Grotius at all. Kant and Grotius 
share some features in the frameworks each constructs--but 
the differences, as shall be seen, are important enough to 
render one a universal ethic and the other a conciliatory 
theory. 
Kant seems a likely candidate for comparison with 
Grotius on this issue because so many moralists equate 
Kantian cosmopolitanism and Grotian solidarity. Since many 
moralists portray their own universal ethics as Kantian, to 
some extent, it seems reasonable to discuss Kant as an 
example of this body of scholarship. 1 And noting the 
differences between Grotius and Kant should indicate that 
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both the moralist reliance upon Grotius and the equation of 
Grotius and Kant need reconsideration. 
A NATURAL PROPENSITY OF MAN 
If the mere inclusion of antagonism itself in Kant's 
concept of asocial sociability made community more difficult 
to embrace, we would be in the difficult position of 
rejecting either community or conflict. But as it is, this 
is not the liberal dilemma. Kant defines asocial 
sociability as a natural propensity, and in order to avoid 
concentration upon antagonism, this is where the discussion 
should begin. By beginning the discussion here, I do not 
wish to suggest that Kant represents other liberals in his 
characterization of asocial sociability as a propensity, for 
some liberals might very well hold that sociability is part 
of man's nature. 2 What I do wish to suggest, is that some 
of the concerns apparent in Kant's argument may be 
representative of those of other liberals. 3 
According to Grotius, man's sociability is part of his 
nature. As discussed above, this means that man is so 
constituted that the maintenance of society is a natural law 
to him, understood through his reason. Kant does not begin 
in like fashion. His statement about the foundation of 
man's asocial sociability is best made in the ''Idea," where 
he says, "This propensity [asocial sociability] is obviously 
rooted in human nature. Man has an inclination to live in 
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society . . . But he also has a great tendency to live as an 
individual. • • • If 4 To understand what Kant can mean here 
in distinction to Grotius, we need to see how the concept of 
propensity operates in his theory.~ Kant explains 
propensity quite fully in Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone. Here he says: 
By propensity I understand the subjective ground 
of the possibility of an inclination ... so far as 
mankind in general is liable to it. A propensity is 
distinguished from a predisposition by the fact that 
although it can indeed be innate, it ought not to be 
represented merely thus; for it can also be regarded 
as having been acquired (if it is good), or brought 
about by man upon himself (if it is evil) . 6 
Asocial sociability may be understood to some extent 
according to this sense of propensity. That is, it may be 
regarded as engendered by man rather than as strictly 
innate. Kant's purpose for discussing good and evil as 
acquired is fairly clear--if the distinction between good 
and evil maxims were merely the natural determination, then 
one could not make a strong case for man's imputability. 
Therefore in the Religion Kant insists that nature itself is 
amoral and good and evil are propensities of man's nature. 7 
Asocial sociability as a propensity is a bit more ambiguous. 
Kant distinguishes between a natural and moral propensity, 
suggesting that the question of freedom and thus 
imputability does not arise with a natural propensity.a If 
this is the case--asocial sociability apparently being a 
natural rather than a moral propensity--then why does Kant 
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not attribute asocial sociability fully to nature as opposed 
to a propensity thereof? 
A response to this question might be found in another 
passage from the Religion. At one point Kant explains that 
''savage peoples have a propensity for intoxicants" even 
though they may never have tasted alcohol; "let them but 
once sample it and there is aroused in them an almost 
inextinguishable craving for it." 9 Likewise, natural man 
may not have experience of some of the fruits which prompt 
feelings of antagonism and competition, such as honor, 
power, wealth. 10 Once man has tasted of these, however, he 
has an insatiable craving for them. The fact that this 
craving is shared by his peers, creates a condition of 
competition and rivalry. Thus that inclination cannot be 
natural but arises from that first taste (taken in society). 
Why that first taste itself cannot be natural (although 
asocial sociability as inclination is itself heteronomous) 
can be explained by the connection between asocial 
sociability and reason, and the nonnatural origin of reason 
itself. 11 In the same spirit, the desire to live amongst 
others in peace and concord is not possible without the 
awareness that others are more than part of the environment 
as well as that one's self is separable from that 
environment. Asocial sociability depends upon the 
consciousness of others as others. Such awareness occasions 
a cognizance of relations which then can precipitate the 
desires of asocial sociability. Thus asocial sociability 
for Kant requires the use of reason in order to be 
comprehensible. 
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In order to make comprehensible the concept of asocial 
sociability, Kant requires that one go beyond the existence 
of a being endowed with reason; that being must have 
performed that first act of reason as well. 12 Kant's 
argument begins with natural man as an instinctual, 
nonreflective being; in other words, natural man begins as a 
nonself-conscious being.13 
In the "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," Kant 
philosophically reinterprets the fall of man as man's first 
use of reason; the horrors accompanying this use, as 
recounted in the Biblical version Genesis, are elements of 
man's sudden self-awareness. 14 For example, realizing he is 
no longer part of nature, man recognizes death. It is not 
that death did not previously exist, but that it previously 
held no meaning for a being undifferentiated from his 
physical surroundings. Erroneously then man attributes the 
difficulties of life to an act which really introduces life 
and makes it possible for him to exist as man. Man begins 
to separate himself from nature as he begins to exercise his 
reason. 
This first act is vital to asocial sociability since 
that concept is inapplicable to a being undifferentiated 
from its surroundings. To compete for honors, power or 
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wealth, or to work for concord, one must exist in society 
recognized as such. 1 ° Kant posits man's asocial sociability 
not as natural, but as following that initial act of reason 
which signals man's entry into society. His first acts of 
asocial sociability introduce him to that toward which he is 
drawn and repelled for the remainder of his species life. 
As Kant says in the third Critigue, the discipline of such 
inclinations toward and away from society strengthen the 
reason in its ability to separate itself from nature. 16 The 
fact that the inclinations are heteronomous means that they 
must be connected to nature--and so are propensities of 
nature. The fact that they await reason and so a separation 
from nature means that they are not totally natural--and so 
are propensities of nature. 
Thus it is that man's enlightenment appears as an 
ever-present possibility for all mankind. 17 Were asocial 
sociability to be constitutive of man's nature, two problems 
would loom before Kant, either of which could affect his 
theory of freedom. One possibility is that, as natural, 
asocial sociability would have to be disconnected from 
reason, which would then exacerbate for Kant the problem of 
man's dual being--since reason would reign over one world 
yet man's society would be destined completely to the world 
of the ephemeral. 18 The other possibility arising, if 
asocial sociability were to be natural, is that reason would 
have to be natural as well in order to be connected. 
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Grotius accepted this, but Kant could not. 19 If reason is 
natural for Kant, then all reasonable acts must be 
determined, which eliminates the possibility of freedom. 
To say that either possibility affects freedom is not 
to say that asocial sociability itself must be viewed as 
freedom. For as already mentioned above, Kant says that a 
natural propensity is neither a question of freedom nor 
imputability. If it were, my argument would be quite 
different. 20 However, recognizing man's asocial sociability 
to be constituted by heteronomous acts of the will, judging 
the acts on a species-wide level, may reveal them to be 
related to man's freedom.21 In the third Critique, Kant 
says: 
As concerns the discipline of the inclinations . 
. there is manifest in respect of this second 
requirement for culture a purposive striving of 
nature to a cultivation which makes us receptive of 
higher purposes than nature itself can supply .. 
But yet we cannot mistake the purpose of nature--
ever aiming to win us away from the rudeness and 
violence of those inclinations . . . which belong 
rather to our animality ... and to make way for 
the development of our humanity.22 
Asocial sociability can be judged to temper reason, to 
strengthen reason to free itself from the strict 
determination of nature. Asocial sociability itself is not 
freedom, but the discipline of inclination which this 
entails can contribute greatly to the progress of reason in 
the species. 
The possibility of man's freedom is paramount. As man 
frees himself from nature, he is more likely to heed reason; 
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only with reason as his guide, as opposed to any other 
authority, can man have any hope of becoming free. Asocial 
sociability then assumes a character different from Grotian 
sociability--a character pertaining to nature but not in 
itself natural. Freeing the individual from constraints is 
the topic of the next section. 
A QUESTION OF INTEREST 
Unless an authority such as the state operates 
according to the maxims of reason, the state could pose as a 
threat to man's use of reason as his guide. The possibility 
arises that the state may not represent the universal law 
but could be a codification of particular interest only. 
The state as particular interest might threaten the freedom 
of the individual. This raises the question of the interest 
involved in the particular. A statement of Ernst Cassirer 
serves as an introduction: 
It is the nature of the state that it should not 
aim at fusing feelings into a unity, but rather at 
unifying acts of the will and directing them into a 
common goal. It fulfills this function only if it 
really succeeds in such a unification, that is, if 
every demand it makes on the individual is regarded 
and accepted by him as an expression of the common 
will . . . the real ''social bond" consists in the 
fact that particular individuals and groups are not 
called upon to rule over others; for such a rule, in 
no matter what refined or ''civilized" forms it were 
exercised, could only reduce us to the most abject 
slavery. 23 
The words are Cassirer's; the sentiment, Rousseau's. The 
meaning behind the sentiment clearly explicates the 
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normative role of the state to be other than the embodiment 
of any particular will--that would only result in the 
enslavement of some--but as the ''common will" which is not 
particular and is therefore universal. The problem, as 
indicated by Cassirer's statement, is well-formulated by 
Rousseau. Lewis White-Beck, Cassirer, and others find that 
Kant sees himself as completing Rousseau's thought. 24 Yet 
in order to complete Rousseau, at certain points (perhaps 
where Rousseau's solution is either ambiguous or 
problematic) Kant seems to correct him. The manner in which 
Kant completes Rousseau, whether a correction or not, should 
explicate the problem of interest and society. 
Kant says of Rousseau in the ''Conjecture": Rousseau 
"shows quite correctly that there is an inevitable conflict 
between culture and the human species, considered as a 
natural species of which every member ought wholly to attain 
his natural end." 2 ~ Even more difficult, adds Kant, is the 
problem Rousseau poses of how culture is to develop man as a 
moral being, in order to "end the conflict between the 
natural and the moral species." 26 The less problematic 
dilemma, according to Kant, is that culture can make it 
difficult for the individual to be happy--Kant resolves the 
problem by denying that man's end is natural (if it is, then 
nature certainly has not secured it). 27 The more 
problematic dilemma is that culture makes it more difficult 
for man to be moral. How does Kant resolve this problem? 
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Whether one interprets Kant's response to Rousseau as 
a completion or a correction may be related to whether one 
sees Rousseau himself as resolving the problems he raises. 
Norman Jacobson suggests that it is equivocal whether 
Rousseau truly offers solace (a resolution) in his 
formulation of the Legislator and general will or offers 
instead a critique amounting to the abandonment of solace. 28 
I suggest that Kant rejects what I shall call the 
"relational'' perspective of Rousseau, and this stance would 
seem to be more consistent with the idea that Kant perceives 
himself to be completing Rousseau's project which Rousseau 
has not adequately completed--in effect, a correction. 
Rousseau claims that while culture and science 
progress, so do vanity and facade. 2 9 The latter are not 
conducive to the moral well-being of the individual. It 
becomes increasingly difficult for the individual to escape 
the social facade. The detrimental position in which man 
finds himself begins first with the necessary separation of 
man from nature--that first use of reason which for Rousseau 
as for Kant is both the beginning of man's life and the 
beginning of his problems. Natural man, according to 
Rousseau, lives in the immediate present and so is not 
cognizant of any relationship between himself and others 
beside what is also immediate and momentary--self-
preservation and natural pity. 30 Nature did not give man 
his sociability or his reason. Rousseau says: 
Whatever these origins may be, from the little 
care taken by nature to bring men together through 
mutual needs and to facilitate their use of speech, 
one at least sees how little it prepared their 
sociability, and how little it contributed to 
everything men have done to establish social bonds. 
In fact, it is impossible to imagine why, in that 
primitive state, a man would sooner have need of 
another man than a monkey or a wolf of its fellow 
creature. • • • 3 1 
In nature man has the reasoning capabilities requisite for 
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that condition--the instinctual properties of pity and self-
preservation suffice for his existence outside of society. 
In advanced society more sophisticated capabilities are 
necessary for survival and so reason becomes far more 
developed. 32 Once man reaches any stage of society, it is 
impossible to return to nature; he has developed the reason 
requisite for an existence far too complex for that. One 
may not return to ignorance once having gained a sense of 
self. Rousseau suggests a relationship between the level 
and type of consciousness and the societal framework. The 
solution to his problem then must be solved by a 
consideration of consciousness--for Rousseau, consciousness 
is a relational factor influencing the shape of society. 
According to Rousseau, society exists as a certain 
level of consciousness is reached. Man's first act of self-
consciousness depends not only upon one's own act of reason, 
but also upon the other. Reason, and so self-consciousness, 
creates the recognition of oneself and others in a certain 
relationship. One's existence in society then depends upon 
recognition of that other--as a societal being, one's 
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existence is in relation to the other. As the world becomes 
present to man as other than immediate, as he carries an 
existence other than pure response, he is able to recognize 
his children, to understand his position in relation to 
others', and then he is societal. 33 This is a relational 
perspective, and requires more than one's solipsistic 
recognition of being. So one's existence as father and 
master depends also upon a son's recognition of this 
relation. There is an interdependence here which suggests 
that the parameters of society depend upon the recognition 
of the members comprising it. Although man must be in such 
a society once his reason has developed to a certain level, 
that first step taken with reason appears to be man's fall. 
Natural inequalities, irrelevant to man as separate 
nonreflective beings, become very relevant as distinguishing 
elements in the interdependence of society. As with the 
father-son relationship dependent upon the recognition of 
both, men in society create a system based upon recognition 
of relevant factors in their relationships. As he says in 
the first and second Discourses, the factors differentiating 
man, since made relevant by man, are no more than a 
facade. 34 Thus society based upon such is no more than a 
society based upon and codifying the interests of certain 
individuals in that society. This relational view indicates 
interested society to be almost incapable of representing 
anything universal. 
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Rousseau's relational perspective is apparent in his 
discussion of the social contract. Even man's consent to a 
particular society cannot in itself legitimate that 
society.3° If anyone can make his interest a standard for a 
particular society, then the recognition of others has been 
manipulated in order to ''legitimate" one group's interest. 
The result is a social contract representing a particular 
rather than the general will which Cassirer mentioned 
above. 36 The result is slavery. But herein also lies one 
of Rousseau's resolutions, for if the contract does 
represent a general rather than particular will, then 
individuals are free from the imposition of another's 
interest which would normally occur in their relations. 
Whether Rousseau's resolution is a plaintive cry or a 
practical solution, it does present the problem of society 
reflecting and codifying particular interests. In his own 
response to the problem, Kant rejects Rousseau's relational 
perspective and, in so doing, demonstrates that the 
individual need not be dependent upon the recognition of the 
other. In Kant's admission of and response to this problem, 
it becomes even more clear that society cannot be vulnerable 
to the threat of interest. 
REJECTION OF THE RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
In this section I shall discuss Kant's rejection of 
Rousseau's relational perspective. In making this 
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rejection, Kant affirms that the individual need not be 
dependent upon an other for self-identification. Kant is 
not denying that features differentiating individuals can be 
made relevant by society and result in inequalities. In the 
"Conjecture," Kant recognizes this; he laments the 
submission of one group's interests to those of another, 
rather than applauding the peaceful community effected by 
such surrender. 37 But although granting to Rousseau the 
fact of inequality, Kant denies the force of relations in 
defining ourselves in society. It is partly in this denial 
and reformulation of society that Kant seems to perfect his 
ideal of society; and it is, in part, in this solution of 
Rousseau's problem that society appears to be other than a 
community for Kant. I shall begin to consider Kant's 
response leading to such a reformulation by a discussion of 
judgment. 
A discussion of judgment is a discussion of man's 
interpretation of his world and life. For Kant, the 
individual may be responsible himself for such 
interpretation. Hannah Arendt, in her discussion of Kantian 
judgment, places judgment in the context of meaning. 38 In 
order to clarify the significance of judgment and meaning, 
consider Arendt's discussion of Kant's ambivalent position 
on the French Revolution.3 9 Many agree that Kant could not 
decide how to interpret the French Revolution--it was 
freedom but freedom by means which could not serve as a 
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moral maxim of action. As a plan of action, Kant condemned 
the event; as for judging, however, Kant deemed the event 
fortuitous. 40 Arendt explains the difference as between 
principles which the actor and spectator follow. 41 The fact 
that such an action would be morally reprehensible, does not 
deny that one can give meaning to that event in judgment; in 
fact, we as spectators must give it meaning. Otherwise 
there is the danger that meaning will be given to the event 
by others and imposed upon us. Although we may be 
spectators in judging, we must not be passive. 42 Kant 
entreats man to think for himself and says that this is 
... the maxim of a never passive reason. The 
tendency to such passivity ... is called 
prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is to 
represent nature as not subject to the rules that 
the understanding places at its basis by means of 
its own essential law, i.e., is superstition. 
Deliverance from superstition is called 
enlightenment. . . 43 
Man must give an event meaning himself; in accordance with 
the project of enlightenment, he must not bow under the yoke 
of imposed thought. 44 But given that, why ought we 
interpret an action that would be morally wrong, as 
salutary? An answer to this seems to lie in Kant's desire 
to interpret this world as an existence of hope and to avoid 
religious otherworldliness (i.e., the tendency to find 
meaning only in the hereafter). If we are bound to 
interpret certain events as negative, then the fact that we 
cannot actually see a moral act would leave us with dubious 
criteria for judging an event to be good. In the "Idea," 
Kant asks, 
For what is the use of lauding and holding up for 
contemplation the glory and wisdom of creation in 
the nonrational sphere of nature, if the history of 
mankind, the very part of this great display of 
supreme wisdom which contains the purpose of all the 
rest, is to remain a constant reproach to everything 
else? Such a spectacle would force us to turn away 
in revulsion, and, by making us despair of ever 
finding any completed rational aim behind it, would 
reduce us to hoping for it only in some other 
world.40 
I shall discuss more fully below, when I return to man's 
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asocial sociability, how the meaning of such action or event 
might be even further explicated in light of Kant's response 
to Rousseau. 46 But first consider another aspect of man as 
judge: his impartiality. 
According to Kant, man as judge can be an impartial--
to use Arendt's term--"spectator.'' Understanding this is a 
first step toward understanding Kant's response to the 
problem posed by Rousseau. If Kant can support the 
contention that the individual can and ought to be 
impartial, this would begin to chip away at Rousseau's point 
that all relationships involve some type of interest. Kant 
would not be denying that interest exists; he would be 
denying that either our own or another's interest need 
define the meaning of our relationship with any other. This 
would allow an opening for defusing Rousseau's argument 
about the dependence of man upon relations with and 
recognition of the other. Kant's discussion of the sublime 
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might clarify this point. The entirety of the third 
Critique focusses upon man giving meaning to what might 
otherwise only be understood mechanically or understood to 
be nonrepresentable. Thus Kant indicates that as far as 
beauty, the sublime and nature are concerned, meaning 
(albeit arising in the subject) can be disinterested. One 
section of the Judgment is entitled "Beautiful art is an art 
insofar as it seems like nature." 47 In this section, he 
says, "Hence the purposiveness in the product of beautiful 
art, although it is designed, must not seem to be designed, 
i.e., beautiful art must look like nature, although we are 
conscious of it as art."48 In other words, the artist must 
not impose upon the spectator any meaning; the spectator as 
judge must be allowed to arrive at a meaning himself. Thus 
man can give meaning to events--that meaning is not imposed 
by any external Being; there is no meaning that the 
individual must discover. 
However, the point that there is no meaning imposed 
upon the spectator by the object does not directly address 
the question of the spectator's impartiality. In order for 
judgment to be general or, ultimately, disinterested and so 
universal, the spectator must be capable of refraining from 
an imposition of his own interest when giving an object 
meaning. This challenges Rousseau: If I am able to judge 
impartially then it is possible that I can refrain from 
imposing my interest upon the other in our relations. 
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Kant does not only affirm the possibility of 
impartiality and, finally, disinterested interest; he 
insists upon the necessity of it. One element of meaning is 
that it must be communicable. 49 For example, beauty exists 
only in society; alone in the wilderness, man would not 
adorn his hut with flowers, etc.~ 0 This admission grants to 
Rousseau that beauty (etc.) can be relational. As a means 
of communication, it is likewise a means of differentiation 
and a foundation for inequality. Yet Kant goes on to negate 
the power extant in such relations by insisting upon the 
need for disinterest if one is to communicate his judgment 
to be meaningful. That is, Kant does not deny that one can 
impose meaning upon another--he calls this superstition. 
But if our judgment is to be understood as meaningful, it 
must not be interested--and this is where Kant begins to 
refute the implications of Rousseau's relational 
perspective. If I judge X to be beautiful, the less my 
judgment depends upon my particular situation and interests, 
the more readily will this conclusion be understood and 
acquiesced by others. In order to make one's judgment more 
than merely particular, he must abstract from his own 
situation, he must put himself "in thought in the place of 
everyone else."~ 1 What Kant is suggesting here is what Max 
Weber and Peter Winch would both deny--that the individual 
can stand in every other's stance and gain a more general 
perspective than he would have ordinarily.~ 2 Thus neither 
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my own nor another's interest need impinge upon my 
interpretation of the world and life in the manner feared by 
Rousseau. 
Thus we need not judge the progress of culture as the 
regress of morality. For impartiality can be more than 
merely general, taking into account the stances of many 
others. It can be an absolutely universal judgment. Such 
abstraction from one's situation provides hope that one can 
act from the motivation of the moral law rather than from 
particular considerations and concerns. In such a case of 
judgment, the requirement of communicability to society 
fades because the universal is absolutely comprehensible. 
Kant says, 
He who by himself (and without any design of 
communicating his observations to others) regards 
the beautiful figure of a wild flower, a bird, an 
insect, etc., with admiration and love ... he 
takes an immediate and also an intellectual interest 
in the beauty of nature.~ 3 
And it is such a one "whose mental disposition either has 
already been cultivated in the direction of the good or is 
eminently susceptible of such cultivation."0 4 Such 
appreciation of nature for itself is an abstraction from 
one's interests and relations; this judgment is perfectly 
communicable yet depends upon no stance for its 
meaningfulness. This is not to say that this is an act of 
morality itself, for it is judgment; but its universality is 
like that required for a moral act. The point is that the 
progress of culture, which culminates in relations of 
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inequality agreed upon by men, need not threaten the 
possibility of moral action. In our judgment we can find 
universal meaning; in our action we ought also to be able to 
adhere to a universal law. 
That progress need not engender only vanity and 
inequality, is also Kant's point in his discussion of man's 
asocial sociability. In his discussion of asocial 
sociability, Kant actually denies that the concept has 
meaning at the level of particular individuals. Judging, on 
this level, forces man into the position of recognizing the 
factors differentiating between him and the other; on this 
level, there appears to be no escaping Rousseau's problem 
except perhaps by a means comparable to Rousseau's 
Legislator. Kant insists that the meaning of asocial 
sociability (as also the French Revolution) be given at the 
species level. At the species level, judgment of asocial 
sociability can be that it furthers culture and encourages 
the creation of legality with the state. Judging man in his 
asocial sociability as a species immediately undermines the 
power which person A could have upon person B in their 
mutual relations and recognition. The very vantage point 
that Kant foists upon us in judgment, compels us to begin 
immediately to separate ourselves from the interest of 
another and to take a step toward giving meaning ourselves. 
The species view will not trap us into recognizing or 
legitimating another's interest as could a particular 
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viewpoint. Kant ultimately replaces Rousseau's relational 
perspective with one emphasizing the possibility of 
abstraction from one's relational situation. Kant offers a 
vision of man's relations, which is not conducive to 
community, but to the universal. 
KANTIAN SOCIETY 
A vision of man's relations conducive to the universal 
is offered in Kant's portrayal of the state. The question 
is how Kant avoids portraying the state as a community and, 
therefore, how a universalist ethic operates differently 
than Grotius's theory. In the third Critique, Kant says, 
... (B]ut still this splendid misery is bound up 
with the development of the natural capacities of 
the human race, and the purpose of nature itself, 
although not our purpose, is thus attained. The 
formal condition under which nature can alone attain 
this its final design is that arrangement of men's 
relations to one another by which lawful authority 
in a whole, which we call a "civil community,'' is 
opposed to the abuse of their conflicting freedoms; 
only in this can the greatest development of natural 
capacities take place. For this there would also be 
requisite .•. a "cosmopolitan" whole, i.e., a 
system of all states that are in danger of acting 
injuriously upon one another. 0 o 
This may not seem to support obligations of men external to 
the state, since it is apparent from this statement that 
Kant supports the state as a means to man's natural and 
rational development. 06 However, when viewed in the context 
of his historical and political thought, it is clear that 
Kant does not support the state's existence as a community. 
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Kant speaks of cosmopolitan society as the Idea of a 
federation of states united for perpetual peace--only then 
may interstate antagonism subside enough to permit more 
complete assurance of individual negative freedom which in 
turn helps secure the possibility of positive freedom (and 
so morality). Kant says that perpetual peace is not a 
probability.~ 7 But because of its existence as an Idea, a 
duty exists not to act in a manner which jeopardizes 
perpetual peace; a duty exists not to act in a manner which 
threatens cosmopolitan right. Thus although Kant strongly 
supports the existence of the state, the state may not 
justifiably look inward to enhance the existence of its 
citizens without a consideration of external rights. Kant's 
portrayal is universalist and does not support the state as 
a community. 
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1 For Kant's use of cosmopolitanism, see "Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant's 
Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 41. Also see 
''Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch" in Reiss, 93-130. 
2 In fact although he is liberal, Grotius holds that 
man's nature is sociable and it is not in saying this that 
distinguishes his thought from Kant's or allows Grotius to 
maintain the conciliation which he supports. 
3 Even though some liberals may not conceptualize 
their theories in terms of asocial sociability, they share 
the same concerns that Kant demonstrates, in particular the 
concern that men be treated equally and so that no body be 
given the authority to rule in its own interest. Of course, 
although the liberal tradition as a whole may be 
characterized as sharing these basic concerns, it is 
actually moralists such as Linklater and Beitz who frame 
these concerns in the form of a prescriptive universal ethic. 
4 Kant, "Idea," 44. 
~ Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alqne, 
trans. T. M. Greene (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) 24. 
6 Kant, Religion, 24. 
7 Kant, Religion, 26-27. 
8 Kant, Religion, 27-28. 
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10 In the ''Idea" Kant identifies honor, power and 
wealth as desires which cause man to seek "status among his 
fellows"; this is in Kant's discussion of asocial 
sociability, 44. 
l 1 Kant, "Conjecture," 55-59. 
1 2 Kant, "Conjecture," 55-59. 
l 3 Kant, "Conjecture," 55. 
1 4 Kant, "Conjecture," 56, 58. 
1 ~ This is all comparable to Rousseau's ideas on the 
matter--that it is in society, recognized as such, that 
inequality based upon competition, etc. arises. 
1 6 Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard 
(New York: Hafner Press, 1951) 283. 
1 7 Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is 
Enlightenment?"' in Kant's Political Writings, trans. H. B. 
Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970) 54-60. 
18 This is similar to the problem which Plato faces, 
where justice as manmade then leaves nature as free but yet 
with no virtue at all. 
19 This does not mean that Grotius's acceptance of 
natural sociability in itself distinguishes it from Kant's 
conception, but that this is part of a greater purpose which 
is distinct in each. 
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20 If Kant were to say that natural propensity was a 
question of freedom, then moral and natural propensity would 
be equivalent and it would be even clearer that Kant's 
asocial sociability as a propensity was separate from 
Grotius's natural sociability. This is not the case for 
Kant--natural must be amoral. 
21 Kant, "Idea," 45-46. 
22 Kant, Judgment, 283. 
23 Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, Goethe: Two Ess~ 
(Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1961) 30. 
24 Cassirer; also see Lewis White Beck, "What have we 
Learned from Kant?" in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, 
ed. Allen W. Wood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 
2 ~ Kant, "Conjecture," 60-61. 
2 6 Kant, "Conjecture," 61. 
27 Kant, "Idea," 43-44. 
28 Norman Jacobson, Pride and Solace: The Functions 
and Limits of Political Theory (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978). 
29 Jean Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second 
Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, trans. Judith R. Masters 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964) 33-64. 
30 Rousseau, 128-129, 132-133. 
31 Rousseau, 126. 
3 2 Rousseau, 101-181. 
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33 Rousseau, 137. He says, " ... [P]erhaps never 
even recognizing anyone individually, savage man, subject to 
few passions and self-sufficient, had only the sentiments 
and intelligence suited to that state ... he did not even 
recognize his children. Art perished with the inventor .. 
. the generations multiplied uselessly; and everyone always 
starting from the same point, centureis passed in all the 
crudeness of the first ages; the species was already old, 
and man remained ever a child." 
3 4 Rousseau, 56-59, 138, 154-158. 
3 ~ Rousseau, 160; Rousseau, The Social Contract, 
trans. Maurice Cranston (New York: Penguin Books, 1968) 59-
62. See also Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of 
Rousseau's Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969). 
36 Rousseau, Contract, 72-74, 151-154. 
3 7 Kant, "Conjecture," 63-65. 
38 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind {New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978) 259. 
a9 Arendt, 258-260. 
4 ° Kant, "On the Common Saying: This May be True in 
Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice," in Kant's 
Political Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 81-83. 
41 Arendt, 260. 
42 Kant, Judgment, 136-137. Of course there is 
another possibility in not judging an event which is that 
the event will not be considered an "event" at all. But 
according to Arendt, for Kant this is why spectators are 
necessary. Arendt, 262. 
43 Kant, Judgment, 136-137. 
44 Kant, "Enlightenment," 54-60. 
45 Kant, "Idea," 53. 
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4 6 It is not that asocial sociability is morally 
reprehensible--it is amoral. However, it is not either 
morally commendable and yet Kant judges it to be good. See 
"Idea," 41-53. The discussion on this is forthcoming. 
47 Kant, Judgment, 149. 
4e Kant, Judgment, 149. 
49 Arendt, 267. 
50 Kant, Judgment, 139. 
51 Kant, Judgment, 136. 
5 2 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, rpt. 1984); Max Weber, The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. Edward A. 
Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York: The Free Press, 1949). 
53 Kant, Judgment, 141. 
54 Kant, Judgment, 143. 
55 Kant, Judgment, 282. 
56 "Rational" because nature develops that capacity 
constitutive of man. See the "Idea." 
t. l 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: GROTIUS AND CONCILIATION 
If Grotius's thought comprises a theory of 
conciliation rather than of universalism, then one might ask 
whether Grotius still offers something to contemporary 
international relations scholars. Having seen how he 
accommodates individualism and community while making other 
changes in his thought; having seen how he retains an 
Aristotelian concern for community while emphasizing the 
existence of universal natural rights; having seen how his 
theory differs in certain important respects from the 
universalist ethic of Kant--it seems that one should 
conclude that Grotius does not off er contemporaries a 
foundation for a universalist ethic. This, however, does 
not mean that Grotius's thought is not relevant to 
contemporary concerns. 
One suggestion that might be made is that Grotius's 
attention to community resurrects a facet of man which is 
not accounted for adequately in the universalist ethics of 
contemporary moralists. To concentrate upon the individual 
as the primary entity of international relations may place 
too much responsibility upon every individual (at least so 
it would seem according to Grotius's thought), as well as 
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not affording much of a context for the individual to 
understand himself in relation to others and society. 
Grotius might offer a more complex notion of man's relations 
to the world than a universalist ethic is capable of 
admitting. Of course to recognize this, one must also 
recognize that Kant's formulation of a response to 
Rousseau's concerns may address some of the very concerns 
thus far preventing any accommodation of the notion of 
community. 
Once again, Grotius poses contemporaries with a 
challenge. In order to understand the extent of his 
applicability to contemporary international relations 
theory, one must decide whether a conciliation adequately 
addresses modern concerns, whether alterations could be 
effected, if necessary, in order to create a conciliation 
amenable to modern concerns. The challenge is to base 
international relations theory upon a universalist ethic 
other than Grotius, or to attempt a Grotian conciliation. 
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